

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5962

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 0660

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJECT: KOREA AT 31ST UNGA: QUESTION OF PRIORITY FOR FRIENDLY
RESOLUTION AND RELATED MATTERS

REF: (A) SEOUL 1227 (B) STATE 037573

1. SUMMARY:

OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT PRIORITY IS UNLIKELY TO
HAVE SAME IMPORTANCE FOR OUR SIDE AT 31ST GA AS IN PAST.
PRIORITY ASSUMED IMPORTANCE WHEN OUR OBJECTIVE WAS
APPROVAL OF FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND DEFEAT OF HOSTILE
TEXT. WHILE WE WILL STRIVE BY ALL SUITABLE MEANS TO
SIDETRACK EXPECTED HOSTILE PROPOSAL, WE AGREE WITH
WASHINGTON'S ASSESSMENT THAT OUTRIGHT DEFEAT OF HOSTILE
RESOLUTION IS NOT REALISTIC GOAL. IF THAT IS SO, PRIORITY
WOULD HAVE LESS SIGNIFICANCE. END SUMMARY.

2. DECISION TO GO FOR PRORITY ENTAILS CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES:
(A) IT WOULD REQUIRE OUR SIDE TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN FIRST SEEKING
INCLUSION OF FRIENDLY ITEM ON PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR 31ST GA.
THIS WOULD SEEM INCONSISTENT WITH OUR POSITION (REF (B) PARA 6)
THAT IN ABSENCE OF DISCUSSIONS AMONG STATES PRINCIPALLY
CONCERNED (THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL), GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION
WILL ONLY WORSEN PROSPECTS FOR RAPPROACHMENT. (B) SINCE
PRIORITY WOULD REQUIRE INDEPENDENT FRIENDLY AGENDA ITEM,

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DECISION TO GO FOR PRIORITY NOT ONLY COULD REQUIRE EARLY

ACTION TO INSCRIBE ITEM ON PROVISIONAL AGENDA BUT WOULD RISK DEFEAT IN GENERAL COMMITTEE WHEN THAT COMMITTEE DECIDES TO RECOMMEND FOR OR AGAINST INSCRIPTION. LAST YEAR WE OBTAINED RECOMMENDATION IN FAVOR OF INSCRIPTION OF OUR TIEM BY ONLY ONE VOTE; A DEFEAT WOULD, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, HAVE CRITICALLY HARMED THE POSSIBILITY OF GEETING THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION THROUGH THE GA. WITH THE 25-MEMBER GENERAL COMMITTEE'S COMPOSITION OFTEN UNDECIDED UNTIL THE FINAL MOMENT, WE SHOULD WANT TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY DESIRABILITY OF RUNNING THIS KIND OF RISK UNLESS SOME REAL GAIN IS OBTAINABLE BY DOING SO. (TO EXPLAIN FURTHER, IF WE SHOULD DECIDE AGAINST WORKING FOR PRIORITY, OUR SIDE COULD ACQUIESCE IN RECOMMENDATION BY GENERAL COMMITTEE TO INSCRIBE EXPECTED HOSTILE ITEM; IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE WE COULD SEEK ONLY TO RECORD AN INTENTION POSSIBLY TO PUT FORWARD OUR OWN PROPOSALS, QUITE DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OF THE DPRK GROUP, UNDER "THEIR" PROBABLY IN-APPROPRIATELY WORDED ITEM WHEN THE MATTER IS TAKEN UP IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE. OTHER (ASEANS, GROUP OF 13, ETC) COULD DO THE SAME.) (C) A THIRD CONSEQUENCE OF SEEKING PRIORITY IS THAT IT REQUIRES US TO LOBBY FOR TWO PRINCIPAL FORMS OF SUPPORT, NAMELY ON PROCEDURE A VOTE TO RETAIN PRIORITY FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AS AGAINST A LIKELY DPRK GROUP CHALLENGE, AND ON SUBSTANCE BY A VOTE IN FAVOR OF OUR RESOLUTION. ON OTHER HAND, IF WE HAVE DECIDED NOT TO MOVE PRIORITY, LOBBYING WILL CONCENTRATE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON BUILDING VOTES FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. (WE WOULD NEED TO SEEK SUPPORT ON PROCEDURE ONLY AS AGAINST A DPRK GROUP "BLOCKING" MOVE, I.E.. AFTER FIRST COMMITTEE (OR PLENARY) HAS VOTED ON THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION, A HOSTILE MOTION THAT BODY DECIDE NOT TO VOTE ON OUR RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, SINCE WE ESTIMATE "BLOCKING" TO BE INHERENTLY UNPOPULAR WITHIN THE BROAD MEMBERSHIP, THE OTHER SIDE COULD NOT LIKELY PUT TOGETHER A "BLOCKING" MAJORITY.)

3. FOR REASONS OF THIS CHARACTER, OUR VIEW AS OF THIS DATE IS THAT QUESTION OF PRIORITY IS LIKELY TO BE OF CONSIDERABLY LESS IMPORTANCE TO ATTAINMENT OF US/ROK OBJECTIVES DURING 31ST SESSION THAN IN PAST. WE WOULD, THOUGH, WANT TO GET OPINION OF CORE GROUP HERE.

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4. A COMPLICATING FACTOR AT 31ST UNGA MAY BE A HOSTILE CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIRST COMMITTEE. LAST YEAR WE HAD THE IMPARTIAL BUT SYMPATHETIC CHAIRMANSHIP OF AMBASSADOR GHORRA OF LEBANON, IN 1974 OF AMBASSADOR ORTIZ DE ROZAS OF ARGENTINA, AND IN 1973, THE YEAR OF THE CONSENSUS STATEMENT, OF AMBASSADOR BOUCH OF DENMARK. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT IN 1976 AN EASTERN EUROPEAN, POLAND, MAY BE ELECTED AS CHAIRMAN; POLAND HAS FORMALLY SUB-

MITTED ITS CANDIDACY. A HOSTILE CHAIRMAN IN A PARLIAMENTARY BODY WHERE VOTE IS RELATIVELY EVENLY DIVIDED ON INTENSELY PERCEIVED ISSUE CAN PLAY A SIGNIFICANTLY ADVERSE ROLE, THE MORE SO, WE WOULD EXPECT, AS HIS ACTIONS WOULD BE SUBTLE RATHER THAN OVERLY PARTISAN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE DECIDE AGAINST A KOREAN ITEM OF OUR OWN, WE WILL NEED TO BE PREPARED TO CONTEND WITH A DPRK GROUP REQUEST TO THE CHAIR TO RULE A U.S. OR OTHER DRAFT RESOLUTION OUT OF ORDER AS BEYOND THE TERMS OF THE ITEM AS FRAMED AND INSCRIBED. WE BELIEVE AN ADVERSE RULING AVOIDABLE, GIVEN SUFFICIENT LEGWORK WITH SECRETARIAT AND CHAIRMAN, BUT NOTE POSSIBILITY AS AN EXAMPLE OF PROBLEMS A HOSTILE CHAIRMANSHIP MAY POSE.

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5. RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH INDONESIAN AND AUSTRIAN MISSION OFFICERS REVEALED THAT GROUP OF 13 IS MORIBUND AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING. INDONESIAN REPORTED ASEANS "FED UP WITH KOREA AT UNGA" FOLLOWING "INCESSANT" BADGERING AND STIFF REBUFFS NORTH KOREANS GAVE THEM LAST FALL. AUSTRIAN COMMENTED THAT "ENERGIZERS" OF GROUP OF 13 AT 30TH UNGA, SUCH AS SWEDEN'S HECKSCHER AND THAILAND'S ANAND, NO LONGER IN NEW YORK AND GROUP TOTALLY INACTIVE. INDONESIAN ATTACHED NO SIGNIFICANCE TO INCLUSION OF KOREA ON DRAFT AGENDA FOR NONALIGNED SUMMIT AS FAR AS INDONESIA IS CONCERNED. HE SAID THAT A RESOLUTION ON KOREA MAY BE "RAILROADED" THROUGH AT COLOMBO, BUT RESOLUTION "NOT BINDING". HE STRESSED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT NONALIGNED COUNTRIES NO LONGER ARE A "COHESIVE" GROUP POLITICALLY.

6. JUDGING FROM AUSTRIAN AND INDONESIAN REMARKS, SOME INITIATIVE FROM OUR SIDE MAY BE NECESSARY TO REVIVE "GROUP OF 13" ACTIVITY ON KOREA SHOULD WE CONSIDER THIS DESIRABLE. WE ARE UNCERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT ONLY WAY TO STIMULATE GROUP OF 13 WILL BE IF APPEARANCE OF HOSTILE RESOLUTION IS MET BY ACTION ON OUR SIDE TO PUT FORWARD OUR OWN PROPOSAL, SUBSTANCE OF WHICH IS AT OTHER END OF CONTINUUM. WHILE MATTER IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, IT MIGHT JUST BE THAT GROUP OF 13 WOULD FEEL LESS INHIBITED IN ABSENCE OF U.S. PROPOSAL.

7. MISSION OFFICERS OF FELLOW CORE GROUP MEMBERS U.K., JAPAN, AND ROK HAVE ALL EMPHASIZED TO US RECENTLY AND
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INDIVIDUALLY IMPORTANCE TO BE ATTACHED TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND NEED FOR MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF ANY STEPS RELATING TO ITS CONTINUED OPERATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE GENERAL VIEW ON OUR SIDE MAY EMERGE THAT THIS YEAR WE SHOULD AVOID DETAILS OF UNC, ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, AND THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN KOREA IN ANY FRIENDLY RESOLUTION, AND SHOULD INSTEAD, OPT FOR TEXT WHICH INVOLVES CALL IN MOST IMMEDIATE, DIRECT AND HIGH-LEVEL-OF GENERALIZATION TERMS FOR TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED (AGAIN, ON LINES OF THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL). IN THIS REGARD, DECISIONS ON MOVING FOR PRIORITY AND ON OPTIMUM SUBSTANCE OF OUR OWN OR OTHER (E.G. GROUP OF 13) RESOLUTION WOULD SEEM TO US TO INTER-RELATE.

8. QUESTION OF MAINTENANCE OF SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION ARISE SHOULD WE DECIDE AGAINST MOVING FOR PRIORITY AND AGAINST INSCRIBING FRIENDLY ITEM. GIVEN POSSIBILITIES FOR ENERGETIC LOBBYING AS SET FORTH IN REF (B) AND FOR COMMUNICATING PERIODICALLY WITH U.N. REGARDING U.N. COMMAND, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO US GOOD OPPORTUNITIES TO KEEP OUR REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE POSITION WELL IN FOREFRONT.

9. AS TO CORE GROUP COMPOSITION, WE WOULD SUPPORT AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM CANADA, COSTA RICA, FRANCE, FRG, THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, ROK, UK, AND URUGUAY AS CANDIDATES:
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